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The unification of East and West Germany provides a unique natural expen- 
ment to study a Soviet-style labor market undergoing a dramatic  and rapid 
transition. Furthermore, the demise of the Communist regime in East Germany 
has for the first time enabled researchers to obtain large quantities of data col- 
lected during the Communist era. The availability of these data sets permits a 
detailed comparison of the operation of the labor market under different eco- 
nomic systems. In this paper, we use several large micro-data sets to compare 
the labor markets in East and West Germany before and after unification. 
Specifically, we address the following questions: How did the income distri- 
butions compare in East and West Germany just before the collapse of East 
Germany? What factors determined wages in these countries?  How has the 
transformation to a market-based economy affected the income distribution in 
eastern Germany? How do former East Germans  who commute to work in 
west Germany or migrated to west Germany perform in the labor market? To 
provide another point of comparison for the wage structures, we also examine 
data for the United States. 
A number of observers have noted that East German physical capital is of 
little or no value. The main asset acquired by West Germany from unification 
is human capital. We therefore devote a great deal of attention to comparing 
education  levels  and  the  economic  value  of  education  in  East  and  West 
Germany. 
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Our main conclusion is that East Germans were well educated and received 
a substantial payoff to their education. Indeed, despite greater wage compres- 
sion in East Germany, the rate of  return to education was about the same in 
East and West Germany in 1988. After unification, the return to education fell 
slightly in eastern Germany. East Germans who commute to work in the west 
have performed fairly well in the capitalist economy. German unions have tried 
to impose a wage structure and bargaining structure on eastern Germany that 
mimics the western model. Although it is very early in the transition process, 
we find that the wage structure of the former East Germany is approaching that 
of West Germany. Most significantly, wage dispersion has increased in eastern 
Germany, especially at the right tail of the distribution, and interindustry wage 
differentials now more closely resemble those in the west. 
The transition to a market-based economy will probably occur much more 
quickly in East Germany than in the other East-bloc countries because of the 
great deal of financial and technical assistance provided by  West  Germany. 
Thus, East Germany’s experience to date provides unique insights into the tran- 
sition process. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 12.1 presents a 
brief summary of relevant institutional features of the East and West German 
labor markets and education systems. Section 12.2 describes changes in wage- 
setting institutions in East Germany since 1989. Section 12.3 offers some theo- 
retical observations on expected changes in the East German labor market due 
to unification. Section 12.4 describes the data sets we use. Section 12.5 pres- 
ents a comparison of the wage structures in East Germany, West Germany, and 
the United States, with particular emphasis on comparing the rate of return to 
schooling. Section 12.6 examines changes that have taken place in the eastern 
German labor market since unification. 
12.1  Labor Market Institutions 
12.1.1  West Germany (FRG) 
Collective bargaining is an essential labor market institution in West Ger- 
many.’  German  unions  are generally organized  nationwide along industry 
lines. The largest German labor union is the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB), which is an umbrella organization that includes seventeen industry 
unions. Roughly 80 percent of all unionized workers are members of the DGB. 
Employers either bargain with the DGB member unions individually or are 
members of a nationwide employer association that bargains on their behalf. 
The employer associations are also organized along industry lines. Although 
wage contracts are ultimately negotiated at the Land  or plant level, the national 
1. Our description of collective bargaining in West Germany draws heavily on Schmidt (1991) 
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unions publicize their wage demands, which then become a standard for other 
negotiations. The public-sector and metalworkers’ unions are widely consid- 
ered important pattern setters. 
A significant feature of the West German system is that it is possible for 
collective bargaining  agreements to become “generally binding” for all em- 
ployees and enterprises in an industry, regardless of whether they belong to the 
labor union or employer association. Either party to a collective bargaining 
agreement may petition the labor minister in the Liinder to extend the contract 
to nonunion enterprises if more than half the employees in the relevant industry 
are employed by firms that were a party to the negotiated contract. Although 
only about one-third of German workers are union members, collective bar- 
gaining may affect as many as 90 percent of German workers because of con- 
tract extensions and spillovers. Burda and Sachs (1988) note that the process 
of contract extension compresses regional wage differences. 
Because a great many nonunion employees are covered by  collective bar- 
gaining agreements, and because there is a good deal of spillover even to non- 
union workers who are not covered by legal contracts, the union-nonunion dis- 
tinction  is not  particularly  relevant  in  West  Germany. As  a  consequence, 
researchers have found only a small wage differential between union and non- 
union members in West Germany, typically ranging between 0 and 5.5 percent 
(see Schmidt 1991; and Blanchflower and Freeman 1992). Owing to the large 
role played by unions, one would expect more wage compression and emphasis 
on seniority in West Germany than in a country with plant-level bargaining 
and weak unions, such as the United States. 
12.1.2  East Germany (GDR) 
There was a great deal of centralization in the labor and product markets in 
East Germany.Z  All firms were owned by the state, and an elaborate plan di- 
rected the allocation of inputs, the distribution  of outputs, wage levels, and 
prices. Only six broad compensation groups existed for production workers. 
Wage levels for these groups, however, varied by industry. But even within the 
wage groups there was extensive variation. According to Stephan and Wiede- 
mann (1990), this variation was quite large and cannot be explained by  the 
official wage norms, with the result that to some extent individual enterprises 
were able to deviate from the planned targets. Much of the “unplanned” varia- 
tion comes from bonuses, which accounted for 6 percent of compensation, on 
average, in East Germany. Enterprises had more discretion over bonuses than 
over the base wage. East German workers were free to work for whichever firm 
they chose, but rationed housing may have frequently limited mobility. 
East German plants were typically much larger than West German plants. 
Vortmann (1985) contends that East German enterprises used their discretion- 
2. For a discussion of the GDR economy and of  the restructuring effort under way, see Siebert 
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ary power to attract the workers they needed. If an industry was at a disadvan- 
tage owing to the wage targets specified in the government plan, firms could 
often circumvent the plan. Thus, the East German wage structure should ex- 
hibit some features that are common in Western economies. Nevertheless, the 
Communist system operated like a large internal labor market, with rules and 
party  membership playing  an  important role in the allocation of  jobs  and 
wages.3 
12.1.3  The Education Systems in Germany 
Unlike the United States, the German education systems are characterized 
by a multitude of different kinds of schools, many of them offering alternative 
routes to a similar degree. Despite their common history, the education systems 
in East and West Germany have diverged significantly, making direct compari- 
sons difficult. Figures 12.1~  and 12.lb contain tree diagrams outlining the edu- 
cation systems in East and West Germany. The systems are described in detail 
in the appendix? 
For our purposes, the main difference between the education systems is that 
the average time to completing a higher degree is longer in West Germany than 
in  East Germany. For example, a university degree requires roughly  seven 
years of study in West Germany but only four years of study in East Germany. 
On the other hand, there were no education fees in either East or West Ger- 
many. And both countries had an elaborate apprenticeship system that was tied 
to public schools and widely used. Although East German elementary and sec- 
ondary schools did devote some time to Communist ideology, the level of  in- 
struction was generally considered to be comparable to that in the west. 
12.2  The Eastern German Labor Market in Transition 
The wage-setting institutions in eastern Germany have  undergone a rapid 
and dramatic transformation. At midnight on 30 June 1990, formal monetary 
union took place. At this time, East German wage contracts were converted to 
West  German marks at a rate of  one for one, and the legal, tax, and social 
insurance systems in the two Germanies were harmonized. In the months fol- 
lowing monetary union, the East German economy sunk into a deep depres- 
sion, with industrial output quickly falling to roughly half its 1989 level (see 
Akerlof et al. 1991). Since the collapse of East Germany in late 1989, employ- 
ment fell from 9.2 million in 1989 to 7.1 million in July 1991.' Unemployment 
increased from around 1 percent of the labor force to over 10 percent of  the 
labor force. And even these numbers understate the extent of employment ad- 
3. This analogy has also been made by VeEernik (1991) in reference to Czechoslovalua. 
4.  For extensive descriptions of  the education  systems, see also Waterkamp (1987) on East 
5.  An estimated 400,OOO  workers migrated to the West or commute to work in the West. They 
Germany and Fiihr (1989) on West Germany. 
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justment because a substantial number of employed workers were put on short- 
time hours (Kurzurbeit),  early retirement, and public works jobs (see Bellman 
et al. 1992). 
Even before monetary union, West German unions aggressively organized 
East German workers. In early 1990, the West German unions achieved re- 
markable success in organizing East German workers, in part because the old 
East German Communist unions were completely discredited. The structure of 
unions in eastern Germany is now similar to that in the west: unions organize 
and bargain along Landlindustry lines, although some contracts are being ne- 
gotiated for all new Liinder simultaneously. The first round of  bargaining in 
the summer of  1990 yielded mostly lump-sum wage increases. However, in 
some industries (e.g., chemical), large percentage base wage increases were 
negotiated. The construction industry immediately tied wages in the east to 
about 60 percent of  the western level. Contracts were generally written for 
short time periods. As in the west, the eastern unions have sought to prevent 
contract wages from varying with the performance of  individual firms. 
The second round of negotiations was held in the winter of 1990-91.  In this 
round, many sectors agreed to tie wages to a specified proportion of the west- 
ern level, and schedules were set so as to gradually achieve parity with the 
west in  1994 or 1995. There was tremendous variance in the eastlwest wage 
ratio across industries at this time. For example, cleaning services in East Ber- 
lin paid 100 percent of the West Berlin level, while the eastern textile industry 
paid 43 percent of  the western level. Most contracts set base wages at 50-60 
percent of  the western level. This exaggerates the relative size of take-home 
pay in the east, however, because bonuses and fringe benefits were much lower 
or nonexistent in the east. Furthermore, work hours are longer in the east and 
vacation time shorter. Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (1991) calculate that met- 
alworkers in Saxony earned 44.8 percent of the hourly wage of Bavarian met- 
alworkers during the first half of  1991, although the base wage was formally 
set at a 58.6 percent level. 
Many  general contracts (Munteltrurifvertr~ge)  were also written in  199  1. 
These contracts set general wage structures for a handful of skill levels. Work- 
ers were thereby classified into skill groups, causing some friction. Notably, in 
the public sector, unions initially negotiated a contract that completely elimi- 
nated seniority pay.  Workers went on strike against this contract, and it was 
subsequently modified. We  also note that several firms are believed to deviate 
from negotiated contract rates. 
Another critical development in the east is the process of privatization, car- 
ried out by the Treuhand. As of November 1991, the Treuhand had sold about 
25 percent of eastern German companies to private concerns and was subsidiz- 
ing a sizable proportion of the remainder (see Economist, 21 March 1992,71). 
The Treuhand closed down only about 6 percent of east German companies. 
Akerlof et al. (1991) contend that managers of Treuhand-operated firms have 
had little incentive or ability to resist union wage demands, a situation that is 
partly responsible for the fast growth of eastern wages. Fachschule 
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12.3  Theoretical Framework 
The wage-setting institutions in East Germany under communism are ex- 
pected to compress wage dispersion greatly. The Communist ideology stressed 
uniformity in outcomes, irrespective of individual differences in ability or ef- 
fort. Nevertheless, the East German system clearly allowed firms some discre- 
tion in wage setting, which should lead the wage structures in East and West 
Germany to have some similarities. Moreover, wage incentives were used by 
the government to induce individuals to invest in training and attain higher 
levels of education. Given the importance of unions in West Germany, we ex- 
pect wage dispersion to be lower there than in the United States but still greater 
than in East Germany. 
After unification, we expect there to be widescale revaluation of individual 
characteristics in the former East Germany. Our guiding theoretical principle 
is that we expect the wage structure in the former East German labor market 
gradually to approach that in West Germany. We expect the two wage struc- 
tures to approach each other because there are now free flows of  capital and 
labor between the two lands. Absent rigidities, differences in wage structures 
should eventually be arbitraged away. Moreover, German unions have vigor- 
ously pursued a policy of imposing the West German wage structure on eastern 
Germany. Because the East German population is only about one-quarter as 
big as the West German population, and because East Germany’s GDP was 
only about 10 percent as big as West Germany’s, we expect that unification 
will lead to far greater changes in East Germany than in West Germany. 
We also expect that younger workers will make the transition to a market- 
based economy more easily than older workers. In particular, firms and the 
government have a greater incentive to invest in younger workers because there 
is a longer period to recoup the investment. This suggests that experience pro- 
files will flatten out initially in East Germany. The effect of unification on the 
return to education is ambiguous. On the one hand, the market-based economy 
is expected to reward human capital more generously, which would increase 
the return to education. On the other hand, the education acquired under the 
Communist regime may not be very valuable in a capitalist economy. In any 
event, we expect wage variation to increase eventually in the east, as those at 
the top of the income distribution are free to increase their position and those 
at the bottom are no longer so vigorously propped up by the government. 
Capital and labor flows take time. Workers are reluctant to move far away 
from their families and friends to find new jobs, and firms are loath to invest 
large sums of money in new capital until they are certain of the quality of the 
workforce and existing capital stock. We should stress that our analysis focuses 
on the early stage of  the transition  process and that the East German labor 
market  is  most  likely  still  in  a  state  of  disequilibrium. Nevertheless,  the 
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indication of the extent of labor market restructuring that has taken place and 
of the distance that remains to be traveled. 
12.4  DataSets 
12.4.1  East Germany 
The East German micro data used in this study come from the Survey on 
Income of  Blue-  and White-collar Households in the GDR (Einkommens- 
stichprobe in Arbeiter-und Angestelltenhaushalten). This is a cross-sectional 
survey that was conducted every two or three years by the Statistical Office of 
the GDR. The survey was intended to contribute “reliable information on the 
level and change of  the incomes of  blue-  and white-collar households and 
about other aspects of the standard of living” in East Germany (Statistisches 
Amt der DDR  1990). Aggregate results from the survey are published in the 
Statistical Abstract of  the GDR and in other official publications. We  were 
able to obtain an IBM standard label tape containing the survey conducted in 
September 1988 from the former Statistical Office of  the GDR. The survey 
was conducted in the year before the collapse of  the GDR, and it is the last 
such survey taken before German unification. The survey contains data on 
seventy-nine thousand  individuals in  twenty-eight thousand  households, or 
roughly 0.5 percent of the total population of the GDR. Krause and Schwarze 
(1990) provide an extensive description of the data set. 
The survey contains detailed questions on various categories of  income of 
individuals and  households. In  addition, the  survey  provides  basic  demo- 
graphic and labor force information about each household member. Finally, a 
set of questions is asked about the households’ ownership of cars and house- 
hold appliances, such as televisions and dishwashers. A household is defined 
as an economic unit sharing income and would include a household member 
who contributes to the household income but lives separately. 
The sampling design of  the survey is  sufficiently different from typical 
household surveys conducted in Western countries to warrant some elabora- 
tion. The basic sampling unit is not the residence of  the household; it is the 
employer. Firms were selected by the central Statistical Office to participate in 
the sample to achieve a representative distribution across regions and indus- 
tries. Within a selected firm, a random sample of employees was drawn from 
payroll  records. The household of  the  selected employee became a target 
household for the sample. The target respondent was contacted early in Sep- 
tember  1988. At that time, the respondent received a record sheet similar to 
the questionnaire to prepare for the interview. The interviews took place at 
the end of  September, and the respondent provided the information on all the 
members of the household (i.e., proxy responses). Earnings for the respondent, 
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supposed to have verified the firm-reported income amounts with the respon- 
dent and to supplement the payroll data if necessary.6  Note that the individual 
who was interviewed may be someone other than the household head. 
The firms selected for the sample are all state-owned enterprises, state- 
owned farms, and certain cooperatives in the trade sector. Excluded are other 
cooperatives, private enterprises, and joint ventures. Individuals working in 
such firms can still be part of the sample if they are members of the household 
of a target individual. A target household drawn within a sample firm was ex- 
cluded from the sample if any one of the household members was currently a 
member of the armed forces or state security or was a full-time employee of 
the party organization or other mass organizations like unions. A household 
was also excluded if the target respondent was an apprentice or working in her 
own home. 
The sampling design leads to a number of problems. First, a household is 
more likely to be drawn for the sample if it has more earners. Thus, the sample 
is not representative of  the households in the GDR and cannot be used for 
analyses of household characteristics. Second, the exclusion of certain sectors 
distorts the distribution of  workers across industries. Despite these problems, 
we show below that the sample is reasonably representative of the employed 
population in East Ge~many.~ 
To the extent possible, the income variables in the sample refer to monthly 
income during August 1988. Vortmann (1985) claims that this leads to some 
distortions in the income measure because August is unrepresentative with re- 
spect to sick time. Some sources of  income, like employment bonuses and 
interest, accrue only on an annual basis. Respondents were asked to report 
annual income for 1987 for such categories, which we converted to monthly 
amounts by dividing by twelve. 
12.4.2  West Germany 
For West  Germany, we use the  1988 wave  of  the Socioeconomic Panel 
(SOEP). The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of about six thousand households 
that has been conducted annually since 1984. All household members sixteen 
years old or older are interviewed directly; the survey follows sample members 
if they leave their original household. Proxy interviews are utilized only in rare 
cases. The panel deliberately oversampled about sixteen hundred households 
with foreign-born individuals. We  exclude this subsample from our analysis. 
6.  The variance of earnings does not differ between self-respondents and proxy respondents in 
the survey. Returns to education are slightly lower for proxy respondents, however.  Vortmann 
(1985) claims that the income levels for proxy respondents are underreported. 
7. It is interesting to note that there are no missing values in the data set because individuals 
refused to respond to certain questions. However, the Statistisches Amt der DDR (1990) points 
out that the survey was voluntary. While the guidelines for the selection of  respondents make 
provisions for the fact that complete refusals will occur, the Statistical Office does not provide 
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Owing to attrition, there were about thirty-seven hundred households left in 
1988, with seventy-six hundred interviewed individuals. The interviews for the 
panel are conducted mainly in March and April of each year. Most interviews 
were conducted in person (about 60 percent); the remainder were conducted 
by mail and to a lesser extent by telephone. 
The survey consists of  a household  questionnaire  and separate question- 
naires for each individual in the household. The questionnaires include a con- 
stant set of items asked in each wave. For the household, these are questions 
concerning living quarters, household income and assets, and noninterviewed 
children. For the individuals, information is collected on basic demographics, 
education, labor market participation, unemployment, earnings, taxes and so- 
cial security contributions, time use, satisfaction with various aspects of life, 
health,  and political  preferences.  In  addition,  there  are topical  modules  on 
each wave. 
12.4.3  Eastern Germany in Transition 
In  1990, the SOEP initiated a special survey of  the former East Germany, 
the  so called  SOEP-East. The first  wave of  the  SOEP-East was conducted 
(mostly) in June 1990,  just before monetary union, and a follow-up survey was 
conducted  (mostly) between  March  and May  1991. The first wave also in- 
cluded retrospective information on earnings in 1989. The sample consists of 
households drawn at random from the Central Register of Population. A total 
of 2,179 households with  4,453 people  over age sixteen participated  in the 
survey. Importantly, individuals were included in the follow-up survey even if 
they had moved to the western section of Germany. Although the SOEP-East 
was recently made available, the SOEP-West was not available for 1990 and 
1991 at the time of writing. We use the SOEP-East to examine the preliminary 
effects of the transition of the eastern German labor market. 
12.4.4  United States 
We use the March 1989 Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate basic 
wage regressions and to describe income distribution in the United States. The 
CPS contains information on individuals in a sample of 56,500 households, 
one-quarter of which are asked questions about weekly  earnings and union 
status. Weekly wages are examined for the United States and monthly wages 
for the Germanies. We suspect that wage dispersion in the United States would 
be even greater were monthly instead of weekly earnings used because of vari- 
ation in weeks worked. In some of our analysis, we also analyze CPS outgoing 
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12.5  Distribution of Earnings and Returns to Education 
We created samples of eighteen- to sixty-five-year-old full-time, nonagricul- 
tural workers in East and West Germany and the United States.8  For West Ger- 
many and the United States, we also excluded self-employed workers. There 
are no self-employed workers in the East German data set. To the extent pos- 
sible, we have defined the variables to be comparable. Table 12.1 reports means 
and standard deviations of  the variables for each country. Mean earnings in 
East Germany were about M 1,200. The spread of the earnings distributions 
can be compared by looking at the standard deviations of log earnings and the 
interquartile ranges. Not surprisingly, East Germany has the tightest distribu- 
tion of  earning^.^ However, there is a significant spread in the distribution. The 
interquartile range of log earnings is 40 percent in East Germany, 50 percent 
in West Germany, and 75 percent in the United States. The standard deviation 
of  log earnings just for unionized workers in the United States is about the 
same as for all West Germany (.41 vs. .44). Relatively tight earnings distribu- 
tions are a feature of both parts of Germany. Figure 12.2 presents a graph of 
Kernel density estimates of the earnings distributions of male household heads. 
To make units comparable, all distributions have been shifted so that the me- 
dian worker earns the same amount in East German marks in all countries. The 
West German and U.S. distributions exhibit greater positive skewness than the 
East German one. 
Some caution should be exercised in comparing income distributions be- 
tween the three economies.1o  First, the income measures are gross of  taxes. 
The income tax  system in East Germany was only moderately progressive, 
with a maximum average tax rate of 20 percent for incomes above M 15,120. 
West Germany, on the other hand, has a highly nonlinear tax schedule, with an 
increasing marginal tax rate up to a maximum income of DM 130,032 in 1988. 
Thus, the tax system is progressive, and the net income distribution would be 
quite a bit tighter. We  do not attempt to calculate net incomes since the tax 
system makes it hard to attribute taxes to husbands and wives in multiple- 
earner families. 
A second difficulty is due to nonpecuniary benefits of  employment. Ac- 
8. We focus on full-time workers because our earnings data for the Germanies pertain to the 
monthly wage, and hours worked will greatly affect the amount of  monthly income for part-time 
workers. 
9. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and VeEemk (1991) find that the wage distributions were 
more  compressed  in  the socialist  economies of Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland,  the  Soviet 
Union, and Yugoslavia than in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Austria in the late 1980s. 
They also find significant differences in the wage structures among East-bloc countries and differ- 
ent trends over time. The East German wage structure is compressed even by East-bloc standards. 
For  earlier  analyses  of  wage  structures  in  Soviet-style  economies,  see Bergson  (1984)  and 
Brown (1977). 
10. Hauser (1991) presents a careful discussion of problems in making distributional compari- 
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Nore: Data for East Germany are from the 1988 Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households, 
for West Germany from the 1988 wave of  the Socioeconomic Panel, and for the United States from 
the March 1989  CPS. Samples consist of nonagricultural, full-time employed men and women. For 
West Germany and the United States, self-employed workers are deleted. 
"Earnings refers to gross earnings in the month prior to the interview plus one-twelfth of annual 
bonuses for the previous year for both German data sets. For the United States, earnings is gross 
weekly earnings on the main job. 
bEast German marks. 
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Table 12.1  (continued) 
‘West German deutsche marks. 
dU.S.  dollars. 
‘Family  income is total net monthly family income for August  1988 plus one-twelfth of  total 
annual income for the previous year for the East German data, formed as the sum of the separate 
income categories. For West Germany it is the answer to the question, “What was the net income 
of  your household last month.” For the United States it is gross total family income for  1988 
divided by  12. 
cording to anecdotal evidence, one means of transferring additional resources 
to individuals favored by  the East German regime was through greater access 
to goods. For example, a physician who was regarded as important would be 
given a house far below the normal cost. Valuing such transfers is difficult 
because often there was no market for comparable goods. Transfers in kind are 
not captured by our data, and their inclusion probably would increase the right 
tail of the income distribution.” Nonpecuniary benefits are also omitted in our 
analysis of the west. 
The third difficulty involves relative prices. Necessities were substantially 
subsidized in East Germany. For example, rent for a one-bedroom apartment 
was some seventy-five marks a month (6 percent of the average salary), a local 
bus ticket twenty pfennigs, etc. On the other hand, luxuries were comparatively 
expensive; for example, a Czech Skoda car cost M 25,000. Therefore, in terms 
of real consumption possibilities, earners at the lower end of the distribution 
spent relatively more of  their budget on necessities and were comparatively 
better off in East Germany than in the Western economies. The opposite is true 
for the rich. Hence, the “real” income distribution in East Germany was much 
tighter than suggested by our measures of nominal income. 
This last difference between the Germanies, which should be the most im- 
portant concern, has evaporated with the monetary union beginning  in July 
1990. Since wage contracts were converted to West German marks at a rate of 
one to one, the 1988 income distribution would have approximately character- 
ized the situation at the beginning of  the transition process. With the major 
exceptions of rents, the prices and availability of goods changed quickly after 
monetary union. Hence, thinking of the distributions as characterizing the situ- 
ation in the Germanies on the eve of political union in October 1990 is a plausi- 
ble exercise. (The average exchange rate in 1991 was DM 1.66 per U.S. dollar.) 
Return to table 12.1. The similarities between the Germanies are even more 
striking when comparing the family income distributions. The table reports log 
standard deviations for total family income. They are computed for the fami- 
lies in the sample with at least one full-time worker. This is the only group for 
11. We have estimated Engle curves for cars and other consumer durables in East Germany. 
These  results  indicate  that,  despite  rationing,  income  was  an  important  determinant  of  con- 
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Fig. 12.2  Distribution of earnings: Working male household heads 
Sources: Data for East Germany are from the 1988 Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households, 
for West Germany from the  1988 wave of  the Socioeconomic Panel; and for the United States 
from the March 1989 CPS. Samples consist of nonagricultural, full-time employed male household 
heads. Self-employed workers are deleted for West Germany and the United States. 
Nore: Kernel density estimates. 
which the East German data are roughly representative. The estimates indicate 
that family incomes in the two Germanies have a very similar level of disper- 
sion. West Germany stands out as the only country where family income is 
less variable than individual earnings. Apparently, incomes between  spouses 
there are strongly negatively correlated. Importantly, female labor force partic- 
ipation in West Germany is quite low (49.6 percent in 1988) compared to the 
United States (59.2 percent) and especially East Germany (81 percent). 
12.5.1  Rate of Return to Schooling 
Table 12.1 reports the distribution among five education categories. The re- 
sults for East Germany correspond closely to the counts from the Labor Mar- 
kets Monitor, the first labor market survey conducted in the new states after 
unification (see Bielinski and von Rosenbladt 1991). As described in detail in 
the appendix, we constructed a continuous years of schooling variable using 
information  on individuals’  highest  degree and postsecondary  training. We 
present evidence below that our linearization works well in practice. 
According to our continuous education measure, on average, workers in East 
Germany spend slightly more years in school than their counterparts in West 
Germany. This is primarily due to the importance of  Fuchschulen (technical 
schools), which were attended by 19  percent of East German workers, whereas 
only 6 percent of West Germans attended comparable Fuchhochschulen. The 
somewhat surprising finding that a larger fraction of the East German popula- 420  Alan B. Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
tion  has  technical  or academic  training  has  also been  observed by  others. 
Scheuer (1990) attributes this to the fact that one trains for occupations like 
nurses at the East German Fuchschufen. Since we included them in the West 
German count for the “technical school” category, we can discard this explana- 
tion. Enrollment in higher education grew rapidly in East Germany after World 
War I1 but leveled off  in the 1970s and 1980s; enrollment in higher education 
in West Germany grew considerably in the 1970s and  1980s, surpassing the 
East German level. 
We estimated standard ordinary least squares log earnings regressions using 
either the unrestricted education dummies or the linear years of schooling vari- 
able. The results are shown in table  12.2. Surprisingly, the estimated rate of 
return to a year of schooling is the same in both parts of Germany: 7.7 percent 
higher earnings per year of schooling, This is in contrast to Schwarze (1991a, 
1991b), who reports a much lower return to education for men in  East Ger- 
many (about 5.6 percent using this data set). Lower returns to higher education 
in East Germany than West Germany are also reported by Stephan and Wiede- 
Table 12.2  Returns to Education: Men and Women (standard errors in parentheses) 
East Germany  West Germany 
United States 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept 























































































Note: Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany and log weekly wage for 
the United States. For additional details on the samples, see the notes to table 12.1. 421  East and West German Labor Markets 
mann (1990) in a study of payroll data for 1988. Notice that our unrestricted 
dummy variable specifications (cols. 2 and 4) also find a lower return to post- 
secondary education in East Germany. 
How can these seemingly conflicting results be reconciled? Most important, 
higher education in West Germany takes longer than in the east. The higher 
education groups-technical  school and university-are  the groups that have 
the most pronounced differences in relative earnings between the east and the 
west. Our conclusion is that the higher returns to these degrees in the west are 
just  due to  longer  schooling,  not  to higher  returns  per  year  of  schooling. 
Schwarze (1991a), on the other hand, mechanically assigns the same number 
of years of  schooling to similar groups for both the east and the west. His 
results therefore have to reflect our dummy variable results. 
We consider the continuous schooling measure more informative. For East 
and West Germans alike, a year of schooling means a year of forgone earnings, 
so in this respect the schooling coefficient is a measure of  the return on a 
comparable investment.I2  From this perspective, young Germans faced similar 
budget constraints in both parts of the country. The structure of the East Ger- 
man labor market apparently did not provide major disincentives for higher 
education, which is also borne out by the finding of similar mean years of edu- 
cation. 
Furthermore, we provide some evidence in  figure  12.3 that the earnings- 
schooling relation is indeed approximately log linear in both parts of Germany. 
The figure displays the coefficients on dummy variables for each possible value 
that the schooling variable can take.13 The graph also shows the lines corre- 
sponding to the OLS regression estimates for the continuous schooling mea- 
sure. The linear specification reflects the unrestricted earnings-education rela- 
tion rather well. 
Finally, the continuous schooling measure allows a comparison with the 
United States, which is shown in column 5 of the table. The rate of return to 
schooling in the United States was greater than 9 percent in 1989, almost 2 
percentage points above the Germanies. The payoff to a year of education was 
unusually high in the United States in the late 1980s, but even in more typical 
years the payoff to education was probably higher in the United States than in 
the Germanies. Given the high cost of college tuition in the United States, it is 
not surprising that the payoff  to a year of  education is greater in the United 
States than in the Germanies, where education is free. 
That we observe more schooling on average for the East German sample 
than for the West German sample, of course, does not mean that the East Ger- 
mans are necessarily better educated. The results may, for example, reflect the 
12. This is one of  Mincer's (1974) essential insights. 
13. There are nine points shown for East Germany despite the fact that education is coded only 
in six separate levels. This is because additional values were created for university graduates under 
thirty. We also separate out physicians since medical school requires an additional year of study. 
For other details, see the appendix. 422  Alan B. Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
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Fig. 12.3  Unrestricted log earnings-education  relations 
Sources:  1988  Survey  of  Blue-  and  White-Collar  Households  and  1988  wave  of  the 
Socioeconomic Panel. 
fact that formal education has been more important in the east while there is 
more upgrading of skills on the job in the west. This is consistent with the 
much higher return to experience in West Germany (4 percent in the first year 
compared to 2 percent in the east). Notice, however, that the experience pro- 
files in West Germany are also steeper than they are in the United States. 
Figure 12.4 presents a plot of  unrestricted  age-earnings profiles estimated 
on the basis of dummy variables for three-year age groups in the two Germa- 
nies. Profiles for unskilled workers and university graduates are shown sepa- 
rately. Especially for unskilled workers, the East German profile is essentially 
flat. Figure 12.5 presents age-earnings profiles for men in the Germanies and 
the United States. Again, the much lower returns to work experience in East 
Germany are apparent. 
The R2's of the regressions in table 12.2 are higher for West Germany than 
for the United States. This is not surprising since there seems to be more em- 
phasis on formal educational attainment and seniority compared to individual 
performance in the German compensation systems. But the RZ  is highest for 
West Germany, around 45 percent, compared to 41 percent for the east. Thus, 
even in East Germany, there is a good deal of earnings variation left over after 
accounting for the standard human capital factors. The system apparently left 
enough room for firm- and/or individual specific factors to influence compen- 
sation significantly. 
It is useful to summarize this information with the ANOVA table for the 
models in columns  1, 3, and 5 of table 12.2 that is shown in table 12.3.  Al- 
though the total log earnings variance in West Germany is twice that of  the 423  East and West German Labor Markets 
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Fig. 12.5  Age-earnings profiles: Men 
Sources: 1988 Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households, 1988 wave of the Socioeconomic 
Panel, and March 1989 CPS. 
east, the same pattern emerges. Slightly less than half the variance is explained 
by standard human capital factors. This contrasts with the United States, where 
the human capital variables explain about the same amount of earnings vari- 
ance as in West Germany. The larger total  variance in the United  States is 
entirely due to the higher residual variation. 424  Alan B. Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
Table 12.3  ANOVA for Simple Earnings Regressions 
East Germany  West Germany  United States 
Total variance  ,099  ,192  ,278 
Explained variance  .04  1  .088  .09  1 
Residual variance  ,058  .I05  ,187 
Table 12.4  Returns to Education: Men (standard errors in parentheses) 
East Germany  West Germany  United 
States 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept 

































































Note: Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany and log weekly wage for 
the United States. For additional details on the samples, see the notes to table 12.1. 
Table 12.2 above also includes a dummy indicating gender; women receive 
25-30  percent lower earnings than men in all three countries, other things held 
constant. Table 12.4 above and table 12.5 report separate wage regressions for 
men and women. The estimated return to education is greater for women than 
men in all three countries. 
Experience profiles differ little for men and women who work full-time in 
East Germany: they are flat in both cases. This contrasts sharply with the West- 
ern countries, where women’s profiles are flatter than men’s. Thus, although the 
average male-female wage gap is about the same in both parts of  Germany 
(25 percent), the gap varies substantially depending on education and experi- 
ence, being much greater at high levels of experience in the United States and 425  East and West German Labor Markets 
West  Germany than in  East  Germany. One may  suspect that this pattern  is 
related to the fact that the labor force attachment of women is much greater in 
East Germany than in West Germany. On the other hand, the United States has 
a female labor force participation rate that is much higher than West Germany’s 
but even greater expansion in the male-female wage gap with experience. 
Table 12.6 reports regression results with additional explanatory  variables. 
Columns  1  and 3 add dummy variables  for marital status and marital status 
interacted with gender. There is little effect of marital status on the earnings of 
either men or women in East Germany, while both  West Germany and the 
United  States have  a  large  earnings  differential  between  married  men  and 
women. 
In column 2, we add a number of additional variables available on the East 
German data set. White-collar employees earn just 4 percent more than blue- 
collar workers. This contrasts with the large effects for the Western countries 
(on the order of 20 percent) and is probably a reflection of  Communist ideol- 
ogy, which was biased  against white-collar labor. Additionally, we find a  15 
percent premium for workers who work on late shifts in East Germany. Such a 
positive premium has proved difficult to find with cross-sectional micro data 
Table 12.5  Returns to Education: Women (standard errors in parentheses) 
East Germany  West Germany  United 
States 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept 












































































Note: Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany and log weekly wage for 
the United States. For details on the samples, see the notes to table 12.1. 426  Alan B. Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
Table 12.6  Additional Earnings Regressions (standard errors in parentheses) 
East Germany  West Germany  United States 
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept 
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Note: Dependent variable is log monthly earnings for East and West Germany and log weekly earnings 
for the United States. For further dteails on the samples, see the notes to table 12.1. 
for Western countries and may reflect the emphasis on rules in the socialist 
system. 
In  summary, these  regressions document  several differences  between  the 
East German, West German, and U.S. wage structures. Nevertheless,  the re- 
sults support Brown’s  (1977, 43) conclusion, which is based on casual evi- 
dence: “The white-collared apart, the most remarkable feature of the compari- 427  East and West German Labor Markets 
son  between  Soviet-type  and  Western  pay  structures  is  their  extent  of 
similarity.” We would add, however, that the lower level of residual wage dis- 
persion  in  East Germany  is  also  a  striking  feature  of  the  Soviet-type pay 
structure. 
12.6  Analysis of the East German Labor Market in Transition 
One question that immediately arises in studying the economic transforma- 
tion of the East German labor market is, How should the East German labor 
market be defined after unification? We choose to define the labor market on 
the basis of  geographic location. Thus, former East Germans who migrated 
west or commute to work in the west are not included in our sample of eastern 
Germany. As a practical  matter, this is of  little significance because migrants 
and commuters make up only about 0.5 percent of our ~amp1e.l~  On the other 
hand, it is instructive to study separately former East Germans whom we ob- 
serve working in the western part of  Germany. These workers provide a rough 
indication of how former East Germans would fare in the West German labor 
market, although one must be concerned about selective migration and com- 
muting. 
Since so  many  east  German  workers  were  placed  on  short-time  hours 
(18 percent of our sample in 1991), we include short-time workers in our anal- 
ysis.  The German  government  subsidized  short-time  workers,  who  earned 
63-68  percent of their previous pay. Firms were supposed to add another 22 
percent to their pay, bringing short-time workers’ pay up to 85-90  percent of 
their previous level. In our sample, workers on short time worked 32.8 hours 
per week, on average, compared to 43.1 hours for workers  on regular-time 
hours. 
12.6.1  Wage Growth and Dispersion 
We turn first to the growth of wages, which Akerlof et al. (1991) and others 
identify as the main source of the eastern German depression. Table 12.7 sum- 
marizes the rise in earnings in East Germany since  1988. The table is based 
on the Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households for 1988, retrospective 
earnings data from the SOEP-East for 1989, and current wage reports from the 
SOEP-East for 1990 and 1991. In spite of splicing together different wage se- 
ries, the  1988 and  1989 data (both years before unification)  are remarkably 
similar, suggesting that the data are comparable. East German wages grew rap- 
idly between  1989 and 199  1. (The CPI increased by about 6 percent between 
1988 and March 1991, so these wage changes can be thought of as mostly real 
14. If we include the commuters and migrants in a log wage regression using 1990 data, when 
they were observed in eastern Germany, their average residual is 0.12. Given the small number of 
commuters and migrants, this finding suggests that they would not have a large influence on the 
estimated regression had they remained in eastern Germany. 428  Alan B. Krueger and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 
Table 12.7  Summary of Monthly Earnings in Eastern Germany, 1988-91 
(standard deviations are in parentheses) 
Average Monthly Earnings 
Measured In: 
Year  Logs  DM  Coefficient of Variation: DM 
1988  7.03  1,179.1  .30 
1989  7.02  1,182.3  .32 
1990  7.15  1,331.4  .31 
1991  7.35  1,635.2  .35 
~32)  (359.0) 
(.37)  (382.8) 
(.29)  (410.4) 
~32)  (568.9) 
Note:  Data for 1989 have been inflated by  6 percent to adjust for bonus payments. The average 
bonus payment was 6 percent of total compensation in  1988 and 1990. Workers placed on short- 
time hours are included in  1989-91.  1991 figures exclude east Germans who migrated west or 
commute to work in the west; if these individuals are included, the mean of log earnings is 7.38 
and the standard deviation .35. 
changes.)I5 Between  1989 and  1990 the average monthly wage increased by 
12.5 percent, and between 1990 and 1991 it increased by another 22.8 percent. 
Over the period  1989-91  wages grew by  38.3 percent. This growth is even 
more impressive in view of the fact that nearly one-fifth of workers were placed 
on short-time hours. 
In spite of dramatic growth, wages in the east were still only about 40 per- 
cent of  the west German level in  1991. Nevertheless, the east German real- 
wage growth stands in marked contrast to that of other former East-bloc coun- 
tries. For example, in the last quarter of  1991, real wages were lower by 43 
percent in Bulgaria, 26 percent in Czechoslovakia, 8 percent in Hungary, 0.2 
percent in Poland, and 20 percent in Romania relative to their 1990 level (see 
Boeri and Keese 1992). Although there was strong nominal wage growth in 
these countries,  extremely high rates of inflation eroded real earnings. The 
unique relation between eastern and western Germany has clearly cushioned 
the transition to a market-based economy for East Germany. 
For the subsample of individuals who were working in both 1990 and 1991, 
earnings grew by 24 percent. Wage growth was exceptionally high for individ- 
uals who changed jobs. Using longitudinal data from the SOEP-East, we can 
decompose the variability in individuals’ log wage growth between  1990 and 
1991 according to the type of job change using the formula 
15. One cautionary note is that, although the average CPI was relatively stable between 1988 
and 1991, there were wide differences in the rate of inflation for many goods. For example, rental 
costs jumped 58 percent in January  1991, while food prices increased  15 percent, clothing and 
shoe prices decreased  30 percent, and furniture prices decreased 20 percent between  1989 and 
January  1991. The rapidly changing prices of consumer goods are likely to have distributional 
consequences that go beyond changes in the wage structure. 429  East and West German Labor Markets 
where u2  is the total variance of the change in log wage, ut is the variance of 
the change in log wage for group i, pi  is the fraction of  the sample belonging 
to group i,  ~1.;  is the mean wage change for group i,  and p,  is the change in the 
grand mean. 
Table 12.8 contains the results of this decomposition. The overall variance 
in log earnings growth for individuals in East Germany (.056) during this pe- 
riod of dramatic transformation is lower than the level that Abowd and Card 
(1989) report for the United States (over .12) but higher than the typical level 
that we find for West Germany using the SOEP for 1984-89 (.036>.16  (In terms 
of  standard deviations, the figures are .24 for eastern Germany, .35 for the 
United States, and .19 for West Germany.) 
Nearly 85 percent of employed East Germans in 1990 and 1991 remained 
employed by  the same firm, and 77 percent remained on the same job. Ten 
percent of east German workers reported changing jobs without any interven- 
ing unemployment. Over two-thirds of the total variance in log earnings growth 
is due to individuals who remained on the same job. Job changers who did not 
suffer intervening unemployment contributed 20 percent of the total variance. 
Looking cross-sectionally, it is clear from table  12.7 above that earnings 
variability increased in eastern Germany following unification. The variance 
of  the level of monthly earnings (in deutsche marks) increased each year since 
1988 and was  150 percent greater in  1991 than in  1988. Notice also that the 
coefficient of  variation of  earnings increased from .30 to .35,  in spite of the 
large  increase  in  mean  earnings.  However,  the  standard deviation of  log 
monthly earnings, which was  .32 both in  1988 and in  1991, shows no clear 
trend. The level of wage dispersion in eastern Germany still has a long way to 
go before it reaches the West German level. In West Germany, the coefficient 
of variation of  monthly earnings was consistently around .44 between  1984 
and 1989. 
Table  12.9 gives the ratio of various percentiles of the earnings distribution 
relative to the median for eastern Germany, West  Germany, and the United 
States in selected years. The wage distribution in eastern Germany was notably 
stable between 1988 and 1990, but the top 20 percent of wage earners gained 
significantly on the median earner in 199  1. The increase in earnings dispersion 
in East Germany occurred mainly at the upper tail of the wage distribution. On 
the other hand, the wage structure in West Germany was conspicuously stable 
in the 1980s, especially compared to the United States. 
To explore changes in the east Germany wage structure further, Figure 12.6 
presents a graph of earnings growth between 1988 and 1991 for each percentile 
of  the earnings distribution. That is, the figure gives the percentage wage in- 
crease for a worker occupying each percentile of the wage distribution in 1991 
16. The U.S. figure is based on log annual earnings. Table 12.8  Variance Decomposition for Change in Log Wage, Eastern Germany, 1990-91 
New job with 
intervening 
unemployment  1.1  .lo6  ,068  .4  1.4 
New job without 
intervening 
unemployment  9.6  .350  ,097  1.9  16.7 
Same employer under 
new ownership  5.9  ,240  ,047  .O  5.0 
Changed job within 
firm  6.7  .279  ,038  .I  4.6 
No job change  76.8  .228  .05  1  .4  69.8 
Total  100.0  ,245  ,056  2.7  97.3 
Note: Data set is SOEP-East. Sample size is 1,443. 
Table 12.9  Various Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution as a Percentage of 
the Median 
Percentile in the Earnings Distribution 
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
A. East Germany 
1988  68.08  82.10  I00  121.12  141.91 
1989  65.45  81.82  100  118.18  142.73 
1990  70.01  83.32  100  120.90  143.84 
1991  69.63  82.89  100  123.83  159.40 
B. West Germany 
1984  62.49  79.37  100  129.99  171.00 
1985  62.15  79.02  100  130.62  173.44 
1986  62.3  1  78.40  100  130.17  173.94 
1987  61.25  77.44  loo  130.33  175.94 
1988  62.49  78.25  100  129.68  173.08 
1989  62.3 1  79.19  100  130.50  171.88 
C. United States 
1979  51.04  66.67  100  141.67  191.67 
1984  49.22  67.06  100  150.00  203.13 
1991  48.54  67.96  100  149.27  218.45 
Note: Data for East Germany are from the Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households for 1988 
and from the SOEP-East for  1989-91.  1989 figures for East Germany exclude bonuses. Data for 
West Germany are from the Socioeconomic Panel. Data for the United States are outgoing rotation 
group files from the Current Population Survey; earnings refer to usual weekly earnings. 431  East and West German Labor Markets 
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Fig. 12.6  Wage increases between 1988 and 1991 by percentile 
Sources:  1988  Survey  of  Blue-  and  White-Collar  Households  and  1991  wave  of  the 
Socioeconomic Panel-East. 
relative to a worker occupying the same percentile of the distribution in 1988. 
It is quite clear that the increase in earnings variability occurred primarily be- 
cause of  an expansion of  the right-hand  tail of the distribution: the top decile 
had extraordinary income growth. Recall that figure 12.2 above showed that 
the right-hand tail of the East German wage distribution in 1988  was unusually 
short compared to West Germany and the United States. 
The left-hand  tail  of  the  eastern  German wage  distribution  experienced 
about average wage growth after unification. This finding is significant because 
one may suspect that the Communist government in East Germany artificially 
raised the earnings of low-income workers and that the move to a market econ- 
omy would have had a greater effect on the low-wage earners. There are two 
explanations for why the low-wage earners were not especially hurt by unifi- 
cation. First, figure  12.2 indicates that there was not a great disparity in the 
left-hand tails of the wage distribution between East and West Germany just 
before unification. Second, after unification, union contracts and government 
policies may be maintaining low-skill workers’ wages above their equilibrium 
level in eastern Germany. As shown below, the fact that the unemployment rate 
is now much higher for less educated workers in eastern Germany suggests 
that there may be some merit to this view. 
Table 12.10  investigates the extent of year-to-year mobility in workers’ earn- 
ings in eastern and western Germany.” Workers are cross-classified by quintile 
17. The period between 1988 and 1989 coincided with an expansion in West Germany. Mobility 
was  only  slightly higher  between  1984 and  1985, which  was  a  recessionary  period  in  West 
Germany. 432  Alan B. Krueger and Jom-Steffen Pischke 
Table 12.10  'Ransition Matrix by Quintile of the Earnings Distribution 
Eastern Germany, 1990-91:  Earnings in  1991 
~~~  ~ 
Bottom  Second  Third  Fourth  TOP 
Earnings in 1990: 
Bottom  .581  ,210  ,114  ,066  ,028 
Second  ,256  ,369  ,239  ,107  .03  1 
Third  ,107  ,234  .308  ,276  ,072 
Fourth  .045  ,117  ,242  ,314  ,255 
TOP  ,010  ,069  .097  ,210  ,614 
West Germany, 1988-89:  Earnings in 1989 
Earnings in 1988: 
Bottom  ,790  ,167  .024  ,011  ,007 
Second  ,158  ,625  ,171  .045  ,000 
Third  ,042  .181  ,601  ,172  ,004 
Fourth  .007  .027  ,196  ,650  ,120 
TOP  ,002  ,000  .007  .I23  ,869 
Note; Data are from the Socioeconomic Panels and refer to full-time employed men and women. 
Earnings are gross monthly earnings plus one-twelfth of annual bonuses. 
of  the earnings distribution each year. There is greater earnings mobility in 
eastern Germany than western Germany, especially for workers in the middle 
of the earnings distribution. In 199  1, nearly 40 percent of the top fifth of wage 
earners in eastern Germany were not in this income class in the preceding year, 
whereas in West Germany only about 13 percent of workers joined the top 20 
percent in a typical year. 
In  table  12.11 we  summarize the characteristics of  the top 10 percent of 
wage earners in eastern Germany in 199  1, the group that has undergone the 
most significant change in relative earnings since unification.'* Compared to 
the rest of wage earners, the top 10 percent is much more likely to hold profes- 
sional or executive positions, to have higher education, to work in private firms, 
to live in a large city (e.g., Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden), to be self-employed, and 
to work in a newly founded firm. By and large, these are characteristics that 
are associated with top wage earners in the west. About half the workers in the 
top 10 percent of the wage distribution in 1991 were in the top 10 percent of 
the wage distribution in 1990, and the average percentile ranking was almost 
in the top 20 percent. Earnings grew by  over 50 percent between  1990 and 
1991 for the top 10 percent of earners, compared to 25 percent for all others. 
Since the top 10 percent of  wage earners still have some distance to go until 
they are as relatively successful in the east as in the west, the evolution of this 
group will be especially interesting to track in the future. 
18. We included self-employed workers in table 12.11 because of interest in entrepreneurship. 
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Table 12.11  Means of Selected Characteristics of Top 10 Percent and Bottom 90 
Percent of Wage Earners, Eastern Germany, 1991 
Characteristic  Top 10%  Bottom 90% 
Gross monthly earnings 
% of compensation due to bonus 
Average percentile rank in 1990 distribution 




Years of  tenure 
Years of schooling 
Technical school (%) 
University (%) 
Short time (%) 




Private firm (70) 
Works in newly founded firm (5%) 
Firm size > 200 (%) 
























































Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Except for firm size and tenure, the difference be- 
tween the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
for each characteristic. 
12.6.2  Wage Regressions for Eastern Germany 
Table  12.12 presents simple wage regressions using each cross section of 
the SOEP-East survey. For comparison, the first column reports estimates for 
East Germany in  1988 and the second column estimates for West Germany in 
1988. The 1988 East German survey yields coefficient estimates and an R2  that 
are very close to the SOEP-East for 1989, again suggesting that the 1988 East 
German survey is reasonably representative of the workforce." 
There are a number of  interesting changes in the wage structure in East 
Germany between  1988 and  1991. First, the rate of  return to education fell 
19. Oddly, the experience profile is steeper in  1989 than in  1988. On further investigation, we 
found that this result is due to a few outliers with low experience. The other coefficients are not 
greatly affected if  these outliers are deleted. Table 12.12  Earnings Equations before and after Unification (standard errors are in parentheses): Dependent 
Variable, Log Monthly Earnings 
East Germany,  West Germany,  East Germany,  East Germany,  Eastern Germany,  Easterners in West, 
Independent Variable  1988  1988  1989"  1990  1991  1991b 
Intercept 















-  ,077 










-  ,063 
(.005) 






































"Wages have been inflated by 6 percent to adjust for bonuses in 1989. 
bEasterners in the west includes 20 east Germans who migrated to western Germany and 97 east Germans who commute to work in 
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Fig. 12.7  Education wage differentials, 1988-91 
Sources:  1988 Survey of Blue- and White-collar Households and Labor Markets Monitor for the 
New German States (Bielinski and von Rosenbladt 1991). 
Note: Apprenticeship = 100 
from .077 to .062, suggesting that education attained under the Communist 
system is less valuable in the transition period. Official government statistics 
on earnings, which are summarized in figure 12.7, also show fairly stable edu- 
cation differentials.20  According to these data, earnings increased by  between 
31 and 37 percent between 1988 and July 1991, depending on education level. 
Workers with no training experienced the most earnings growth, followed by 
university graduates. 
Second, the already flat experience profiles in East Germany have become 
slightly flatter by  1991. We  also find very low returns to seniority. Evidently, 
experience in the Communist labor market is now  of  less value. Third, the 
male-female wage gap has  narrowed. The labor force participation rate for 
women in East Germany fell, moving in the direction of West German women, 
but the rate fell by almost as much for men. Fourth, the explanatory power of 
20. The underlying data are from Bielinski and von Rosenbladt (1991) and our tabulations of 
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the regressions has dropped considerably, with the R2  falling from 41 to 28 
percent between 1990 and 1991. Finally, the residual variance increased by 47 
percent (from .050 to .074) between  1990 and  1991. These findings suggest 
that there have been major changes in the valuation of individuals’ characteris- 
tics since unification. 
In other specifications, we have added a dummy variable indicating whether 
a worker is on short-time hours and a dummy indicating white-collar status. 
Workers on short-time hours earn about 23 percent less (t-ratio = -  12) than 
full-time workers, other things being equal. This differential is about what one 
would expect since firms are required to supplement short-time workers’ pay 
to 85-90  percent of their previous level. Including the short-time dummy re- 
duces the return to education slightly and increases the male-female wage gap 
by about four points. 
Interestingly, white-collar workers in the east now earn an 11 percent wage 
premium over blue-collar workers (t-ratio = 6.2). This may be contrasted with 
the 4 percent white-collar premium in East Germany in 1988 and the 19 per- 
cent premium in West Germany in 1988 that we document in table 12.6 above. 
As far as white-collar work is concerned, the wage structure in East Germany 
is approaching that in the west. 
We have also examined the evolution of industry wage differentials in east- 
em Germany. Specifically, we added (broad) industry dummy variables to the 
wage regressions in table 12.2 and estimated industry wage differentials for 
East and West Germany. We then took deviations of each industry coefficient 
from the average, assigning a differential of  zero to the omitted industry. To 
West Germany 1989  West Germony 1989 
OLS Regression Line 
East = 0 oO+  0 I I West  R- square = 0 07  East = 0 00 + 0 51 West  R-  square = 0 I9 
I0041  I0  301  I0 101(030) 
Fig. 12.8  Comparison of industry wage differentials 
Sources:  1989  wave  of  the  Socioeconomic Panel-West  and  1990 and  1991  waves  of  the 
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illustrate the evolution of industry wage differentials in eastern Germany rela- 
tive to those in western Germany, figure 12.8 presents graphs of  the east Ger- 
man differentials in 1990  or 1991 versus the West German differentials in 1989. 
The figures are striking. In 1990, east German industry wage differentials were 
extremely compressed, ranging less than  15 percent from highest to lowest 
paid industry; in West Germany the range was about 30 percent. Moreover, the 
correlation between industry wage differentials in the east and the west was 
statistically insignificant in 1990. 
By  1991, the east German industry wage differentials  were far more dis- 
persed, with a range of 40 percent between the highest- and the lowest-paying 
industry. Finance, insurance, and real estate increased in position relative to 
the mean industry by 25 percentage points, while relative pay in the service 
industry fell by  10 points.  Moreover,  the pattern of  industry differentials  in 
eastern Germany now more closely resembles the west German pattern. The 
rapid change in the eastern interindustry wage  structure is probably due, in 
large part, to the German unions'  success in negotiating industry-level  con- 
tracts that follow a similar pattern to western contracts. 
12.6.3  Easterners Who Work in the West 
A small number of eastern Germans surveyed in the SOEP-East migrated to 
the west since the initial wave of the survey was conducted.*' For a sample of 
twenty  migrants, we have complete wage and demographic information. An 
additional ninety-seven sampled individuals commute to work in the west but 
live in the east. These 117 easterners who work in the west have virtually the 
same level of education as easterners who work in the east but are about eight 
years younger, are much more likely to be men, are less likely to hold white- 
collar jobs (37 vs. 53 percent), and have much lower tenure (0.8 vs. 11 years). 
Bielinski and von Rosenbladt (1991) estimate that 28 percent of  commuters 
received on-the-job training in a three-month period in  199  1, as compared to 
17 percent of those who do not commute. 
The average easterner who works in the west earns DM 2,990 per month, 
which is 83 percent more per month than the average for easterners who work 
in the east but about 15 percent less than the average west German. The rela- 
tively small gap in earnings between easterners who commute or migrated to 
the west and native west Germans is noteworthy because the commuters/mi- 
grants have extremely low tenure and do not possess other observable charac- 
teristics that are particularly highly rewarded in the west German labor market. 
Column 6 of table  12.12 presents the estimated log earnings equation for 
the small sample of eastern Germans who work in the west. Although the esti- 
mates are extremely imprecise, they reveal some interesting patterns.22  First, 
21. For a landmark study of migration between eastem and western Germany, see Akerlof et 
22. We found qualitatively similar results for a larger sample of commuters using data from the 
al. (1991). 
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the return to education for workers who were educated in the east but work in 
the west is relatively large (.065).  Although some caution is warranted because 
of  sampling variance, this finding nonetheless suggests that the high level of 
education that East Germans received  under the Communist system will re- 
ceive a reasonable payoff as the east approaches a Western-style market econ- 
omy. Second, the experience profile is virtually flat, again suggesting that work 
experience gained under the Communist  system is of little value. Third, the 
male-female wage gap is greater for easterners who work in the west. Finally, 
the residual variance in earnings is quite close to the level for West Germany 
in 1988. 
12.6.4  Unemployment 
An important issue in addition to wage structure changes concerns the evolu- 
tion of unemployment in eastem Germany. Unemployment in eastern Germany 
soared after unification, as it has in other former East-bloc countries. The prob- 
ability of being unemployed in eastern Germany is inversely related to educa- 
tion level. We calculate that, in 1991, the unemployment rate was 6 percent for 
university graduates, 2 percent for master craftsmen,  10 percent for workers 
with apprenticeship training, and 33 percent for workers with no postsecond- 
ary training.23  Similarly, workers with a low level of education were also much 
more likely to be placed on short-time hours. There was hardly any unemploy- 
ment in  1988 in East Germany. The unemployment rates by education level 
in West Germany are much lower, especially at the low end of the education 
distribution. For example, Abraham and Houseman (chap. 11 in this volume) 
report that the unemployment rate in West Germany for workers with no post- 
secondary training in 1989 is 11.6 percent. 
The high rate of unemployment for low-educated workers suggests that their 
wage rate is above the current equilibrium level. On the other hand, the more 
moderate rates of unemployment  for highly skilled workers  suggest that the 
wage structure is not far out of  line for these workers. We note, however, that 
government policies to reduce unemployment (e.g., short-time work subsidies) 
may mask substantial imbalances in supply and demand. 
We also note that, if the unemployed are very different from the employed in 
terms of unobserved characteristics, truncation bias may affect our regression 
estimates. On the other hand, this is not likely to be a serious problem because 
much of the unemployment is due to plant closings and mass layoffs, which 
affect a wide cross section of workers. Furthermore, we find that the results are 
qualitatively similar if we estimate the regressions for eastern Germany using 
just the subsample of individuals who were continuously employed between 
1989 and 1991. This finding suggests that the differences in the wage structure 
that we document between 1989 and 1991 are not due to the changing compo- 
sition of the samples. 
23. We also find that the unemployment rate is almost twice as high for women as it is for men 
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12.7  Summary and Conclusion 
We can summarize our main conclusions as follows. 
1. In 1988, the wage structure was more compressed in East Germany than 
in West Germany, even though West Germany has low  wage  variability  by 
US.  standards. 
2.  In spite of the considerable wage compression in East Germany, education 
was relatively  highly rewarded. The monetary  payoff  to a year of  education 
was remarkably similar in East and West Germany. Furthermore, East Germans 
who migrated or commuted to western Germany after the collapse of East Ger- 
many  appear to earn a comparable  return  to their education  as native West 
Germans. Since East Germans are highly educated, this finding suggests that 
the unified Germany will have considerably more human capital. 
3. Average  earnings of  eastern  Germans  grew rapidly  following unifica- 
tion-by  as much as 30-40  percent. Surprisingly, this great leap in wages oc- 
curred without unusually high variability in earnings growth across individu- 
als. The cross-sectional  variance in  earnings growth in eastern Germany in 
1990-91  was below the typical level for the United States but above the typical 
level for West Germany. 
4. Wage regressions for 1990 and  1991 already  show signs that the East 
German  wage  structure is quite different than  it was in  1989. White-collar 
workers in eastern Germany now earn a substantial premium, although not as 
large a premium as white-collar workers earn in the west. Similarly, the indus- 
try wage structure in eastern Germany is approaching the West German struc- 
ture. The remarkably low level of dispersion in earnings that we documented 
for East Germany in 1988 is gradually increasing, primarily because the right- 
hand tail of the distribution is stretching out. In addition, exDerience profiles 
have flattened out, suggesting that work experience gained under the Commu- 
nist system is now of little value. 
5. Eastern Germans who are observed working  in western  Germany earn 
almost as much as native West Germans,  and, with the major exception  of 
work experience, they appear to earn similar payoffs to their characteristics as 
West Germans. 
6. The wage structure in eastern Germany, however, still has some distance 
to go until it mirrors the wage structure in western Germany. In particular, we 
expect that it will be a long time until the experience-earnings profile becomes 
as steep in eastern Germany as it is in the west. In addition, industry and occu- 
pation premiums are still compressed in the east relative to the west. Although 
wages served mainly a bookkeeping function in the former East Germany, they 
now serve as signals to firms and workers. The effect of the remaining differ- 
ences in the wage structures on migration and capital flows between eastern 
and western Germany seems to us to be a worthy topic of future study. 
We think that the facts documented in this paper are consistent with the view 
that German unions and government policies have maintained wages of  low- 
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wage structure that more closely mirrors the western wage structure. Govern- 
ment policy has protected low-skill workers. The Treuhandanstalt has pursued 
a policy of deliberately seeking new owners who would maintain employment, 
and the introduction of West German labor law has made it difficult to lay off 
workers or to deviate from union contracts. As a consequence, after unification 
high-income earners improved their position relative to middle-income earn- 
ers, but low-income earners did not lose any ground relative to middle-income 
earners. The unemployment rate soared for low-skill workers, suggesting that 
employers’ demand for low-skill workers is low at their current level of remu- 
neration. 
What will happen in the future? The German government and employers are 
providing  a great deal of  training to former East German  workers, which 
should eventually improve the productivity and employment situation of  less 
educated workers. Furthermore, more and better capital is flowing into eastern 
Germany, which would further raise productivity and sustain high wages for 
low-skill workers. Finally, our findings that commuters and migrants are doing 
quite well in the western German labor market and that the return to education 
has remained relatively high in eastern Germany suggest that worker skills 
are not the main problem in eastern Germany. Instead, outdated technology, 
insufficient capital, and inefficient management may be the main sources of 
low wages and productivity in the east. In  any event, we conclude that the 
wage structure in eastern Germany has made substantial progress toward a new 
equilibrium that  will  eventually more  closely resemble the West  German 
wage structure. 
Appendix 
Description of Education Systems in the Germanies 
Primary school in West Germany starts at the age of six and comprises the 
first four grades. After grade four, the secondary school system branches into 
three alternative routes. The most basic branch (Huuptschule)  lasts up to grade 
9 (or grade 10 in some states) and combines general education with certain 
preparatory courses for more technical or clerical vocations. It is supposed to 
lead to a subsequent apprenticeship or vocational training. The middle branch 
(Reulschule)  has a different vocational focus than the Huuptschule and offers a 
larger choice between liberal arts classes and courses with a more practical 
orientation. This branch ends after grade 10 and may lead to an apprenticeship, 
further education in vocational schools, or a switch into Gymnasium, which is 
the third branch of the secondary school system. 
The Gymnasium is the most intellectually oriented track and is designed to 
provide a thorough education in the liberal arts that prepares students for fur- 441  East and West German Labor Markets 
ther academic training. Gymnasium ends after grade 13 with a general exam 
(Abitur) that serves as a prerequisite for access to the university system. The 
last two years of Gymnasium are roughly comparable to the first years of col- 
lege in the United States. Since the 1970s, some states have introduced inte- 
grated secondary schools (Gesamrschulen) combining all three branches and 
leading to the various secondary school degrees. 
University training in West Germany is completely focused on the area of 
specialization and ends in a Diploma. The average time to completion was 6.9 
years in 1987 (Scheuer 1990) and has increased even more since. In addition 
to academic universities, there is another kind of  postsecondary institution 
known as Fachhochschulen. These institutions offer a more practically ori- 
ented training, usually in engineering or business disciplines; they are roughly 
comparable to professional colleges in the United States. Furthermore, the 
courses of  study are generally shorter than in the universities (the average 
length  was 4.4 years  in  1987). Fachhochschulen can  be  entered after the 
twelfth grade in  Gymnasium or after completion of  a Fachoberschule. The 
latter comprises grades 11 and 12 and can be entered with a Realschule degree 
or the equivalent. It combines practical job-oriented training in workshops with 
more general education. 
Vocational training in West Germany consists usually of an apprenticeship 
in  a  business firm  combined  with  part-time  schooling at  a  state run  Be- 
rufsschule. Apprenticeships can last for two to four years, during which time 
apprentices earn a basic allowance from their employer. Berufsschule provides 
theoretical foundations for the profession in which an apprentice has trained 
as well as liberal arts education. A completed apprenticeship is a prerequisite 
to many skilled jobs in industry, administration, and the service sector. Two to 
three  years  after  completion,  trained  workers  can  enroll  in  a  two-year 
Fachschule, which enables them to become master craftsmen in their field. 
East Germany 
Owing to a series of reforms, the education system in East Germany is sim- 
pler. The main building block is the integrated Polytechnische  Oberschule 
(POS), which is compulsory for everyone up to grade 10. Its quality and scope 
are generally regarded as comparable to the West German Realschule. Further 
secondary training is provided in the Erweiterten  Obersrufe (EOS) for two 
more grades, leading to the East German Abitul: Access to the EOS is condi- 
tional on grades and political factors. In  addition, social diversity in student 
representation is a consideration in admission to the EOS. 
Unlike in West Germany, admission to a university is conditional on an addi- 
tional entry exam. Admitted are EOS graduates, graduates of Fachschulen (see 
below), young workers who completed a three-year apprenticeship with Abitur, 
and graduates of the preparatory “Worker and Peasant Faculties” (for details, 
see Glaessner 1985). These indirect routes to university serve the purpose of 
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are quantitatively much more important than in the west. Since the  1970s, 
three-quarters of the students seeking admission to a university have had some 
work experience or completed their military training. This has led to the grad- 
ual introduction of a one-year practical training requirement for EOS graduates 
without professional training starting in 1976, basically lengthening their edu- 
cation by a year (Panorama DDR 1984). 
Admissions to the various fields are regulated by  state plan reflecting the 
prospective needs of  a profession. This planning was apparently not always 
fully effective: many university graduates were overqualified for their jobs in 
the  1970s, which led to a reduction in the number of  admissions (Scheuer 
1990). This trend was reversed somewhat in the 1980s. Most university pro- 
grams in East Germany are designed to be completed in four years; a one-year 
extension is granted only in exceptional cases. Only about three-quarters of 
university courses are devoted to the major field of study; the rest of the cumc- 
ulum is taken up by  courses in Marxism-Leninism, languages, and sports. 
Fuchschulen in East Germany are postsecondary institutions comparable to 
the West German Fuchhochschulen. They mainly train engineers and technical 
experts and, since the 1970s, nurses. Fuchschulen have three-year programs. 
They admit graduates of the EOS as well as young men and women who have 
completed practical training. 
Like in the west, vocational training in the east consists of a dual education 
combining an  apprenticeship with  vocational  school (Berufsschule). These 
schools are usually part of the enterprise offering the apprenticeship. Most ap- 
prenticeship programs last two years. 
Derivation of Continuous Years of Schooling Variable 
For the United States, years of school completed is collected directly in the 
Current Population Survey. For East Germany and West  Germany, years of 
schooling is inferred from the worker’s degree. 
Education in our 1988 East German survey is measured in six discrete cate- 
gories. The groups are less than tenth grade, completed tenth grade at a POS, 
apprenticeship training, master craftsmen, technical school (Fuchschule),  and 
university. Unfortunately, this is a rather coarse grouping; in particular, second- 
ary school degrees and postsecondary qualifications are not coded separately. 
We  report results with four education dummies as well as for a continuous 
schooling measure. The latter measure was constructed as follows. Nine years 
of schooling were assumed for workers who did not complete school, ten years 
if  tenth grade was completed. The first group is rather unimportant and was 
lumped together with the second in the dummy variable regressions (this will 
be the base group). Two  years of  apprenticeship training was  assumed, al- 
though a basic allowance is paid during this time by the employer. Four years 
of training was assumed for master craftsmen. Technical school lasts for three 
years and requires completion of  the EOS or a two-year practical training, 
yielding a total of  fifteen years of  education. Finally, university courses last 443  East and West German Labor Markets 
usually four years beyond EOS, yielding a total of  sixteen. Since the mid- 
1970s, an  additional one-year practical training requirement was introduced 
for EOS graduates. Thus, we assumed an additional year of schooling for ev- 
eryone with university education who is under age thirty. 
For the West German survey, we have more complete information on educa- 
tional attainment. In particular, secondary school degrees and further training 
are coded separately. Education categories are formed as follows. Anyone who 
does not report any postsecondary training becomes part of  the base group. 
The second group comprises everybody who completed an apprenticeship, Be- 
rufsfachschule, or schools for public-sector occupations. The third group com- 
prises graduates of Fachschulen and anyone who reports holding a position as 
master craftsman. The next group includes graduates of Fuchhochschulen and 
everyone who went to nursing school since this group has been trained at East 
German  Fuchschulen  since the  1970s. University  graduates form  the  last 
group. 
The continuous schooling measure was constructed using the information 
on both secondary school degree and postsecondary training. For the group 
with no postsecondary education, the number of years to complete secondary 
school was used. Ten years of  education were assumed for the category re- 
porting other degrees (largely special schools) and nine years for anyone with 
no secondary degree. For completed apprenticeship, Berufsfuchschule, public- 
sector training, and nursing schools, two years were added. For graduates of 
Fuchschulen, 3.5 years were added since they must complete an apprentice- 
ship, which can last for one or two years. We  assumed Fuchhochschule to last 
four years. It can be reached by a variety of different routes. For graduates with 
Abitur or  Fuchhochschulreife, thirteen and twelve years of  secondary school 
were  used.  For  graduates of  Hauptschule  and  Reulschule,  three  years  of 
schooling beyond secondary school were assumed before Fachhochschule can 
be entered. Six years of  university training were assumed, yielding a total of 
nineteen years for everyone with Abitul: We  used twenty years for everyone 
who does not report Abitur since they probably reached university on a more 
roundabout route, for example, by attending Fuchhochschule first. 
Some of  our assumptions may  be debatable. For example, it is unclear 
whether for a certain degree only the minimum number of  years necessary 
should be counted or a higher number if a more roundabout route was chosen. 
Helberger (1988) reviews the German literature and discusses these issues in 
detail without reaching a clear conclusion. 
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